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Diaspora networks' non-economic remittances in the forms of social, political, cultural and 
technical contributions to their homeland play important roles in entrepreneurship and economic 
development. In this paper, we examine the effects of such remittances on entrepreneurship 
development in economies in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC). We analyze how factors 
such as migrants' skills and education and characteristics of the host country are likely to affect 
non-economic remittances and their contribution to entrepreneurship and economic development. 
We offer some examples of initiatives taken in the home country and the host country to 
maximize the potential non-economic remittances and their impacts on entrepreneurship 
development in the home country. A key lesson and take-away that we can gain from 
entrepreneurially successful efforts of some economies is that the primary focus of diaspora 
policies need to be centered on utilizing various forms of non-economic remittances in 
stimulating the quantity and quality of entrepreneurial activity. 
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Diaspora networks are playing an important role in the development of entrepreneurship in 
developing countries. For instance, Woodruff and Zenteno’s (2007) survey of microenterprises 
in Mexico found that about one-third of the capital invested was associated with migration to the 
United States. It is argued that economic remittances from diaspora networks play the role of 
financial intermediaries in the sense that such remittances enable households and micro-
entrepreneurs to overcome credit constraints and imperfections they face in the financial markets 
in developing countries. Households and micro-enterprises receiving economic remittances are 
able to invest in human and physical capital, which is likely to stimulate entrepreneurial 
activities and contribute to long-run economic growth of a country (Mundaca, 2009). Perhaps 
even more impressive is that the population at the middle-to-bottom end of the wealth 
distribution is more likely to benefit from economic remittances (Lucas, 1987; Rozelle et al., 
1999; Woodruff and Zenteno, 2007). Note that poor households often face a high degree of 
credit constraints and thus, have low degree of access to self-employment and entrepreneurship 
(Mundaca, 2009). This issue is rather important because of the fact that poverty reduction has 
been identified as a key entrepreneurial impact (Ahmad and Hoffmann, 2008; Kshetri et al., 
2014). 
 
Moving to the focus of this paper, the concept of remittances has been broadened from an 
exclusively economic term to include social, political, technological, technical and cultural 
contributions such as transfers of entrepreneurial skills, experience, ideas, technology and 
knowledge as well as cultural and civic awareness in the diaspora networks’ ancestral homeland 
(Connell et al., 2007; Goldring, 2003, 2004; Levitt, 1998; Saxenian and Sabel, 2008; Nyberg-
Sorensen, 2004). Prior research has indicated that the contributions of non-economic remittances 
to socio-economic development are no less important, and may in fact be even more important 
(Kshetri, 2013). 
 
Despite the above observations, most research on the diaspora’s contributions to the homelands 
has focused primarily on economic remittances (Brinkerhof, 2008). Prior researchers have 
suggested that theories that focus purely on economic factors cannot capture the broader social 
and other non-economic factors that may affect remittancesrelated decisions (Castels, 2000). 
Nonetheless, the role of non-economic remittances in socio-economic development has been 
under-researched and under-valued (Kshetri, 2013). In little research have scholars examined the 
non-economic remittances associated with diaspora networks such as their roles in bringing 
changes in entrepreneurship related institutions in the developing world. This research gap is 
serious because the diaspora networks’ possible roles in bringing entrepreneurship-friendly 
institutions in developing economies have received much attention in the popular press and 
policy debates (e.g., Annan, 2011). For instance, Diaspora Policy has been a key component of 
long-term development plans of some economies such as Rwanda (Kshetri et al., 2014). 
 
The objective of this paper is to investigate how factors such as migrants’ skills, education and 
linkages with the homeland and characteristics of the host country may affect non-economic 
remittances and their contribution to entrepreneurship and economic development. We argue that 
economies in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) represent a fertile ground for studying the 
roles of the influence of diaspora networks’ noneconomic remittances in entrepreneurship 
development. This is because key economies in the region, such as Brazil, Chile, and Colombia, 
have taken a number of measures to maximize diaspora networks’ effects on entrepreneurship 
development in the homelands. Therefore, this analysis will bridge a gap in the literature by 
providing insights into how key characteristics of the diaspora networks might be related to non-
economic remittances and their impacts on entrepreneurship. 
 
Before proceeding, we offer some clarifying definitions. By institutions, we mean “macro-level 
rules of the game” (North, 1990), which include “formal constraints (rules, laws, constitutions), 
informal constraints (norms of behavior, conventions and self-imposed codes of conduct) and 
their enforcement characteristics” (North, 1996). Likewise, we define the diaspora groups as 
ethnic/national groups migrated from their ancestral homeland to a foreign country, referred to in 
this paper as the host or the destination country (Kitching et al., 2009). The migration could be 
temporary as well as permanent. 
 
The paper is structured as follows. We proceed by first examining some theories, anecdotes, 
observations and best practices regarding non-economic remittances associated with diaspora 
groups. Next, we analyze some key determinants of non-economic remittances associated with 
diaspora groups in the case of the LAC. Then, we look at various types of non-economic 
remittances and illustrate them in the LAC context. We then present a section that discusses 
some measures taken by LAC economies that might stimulate non-economic remittances. The 
final section provides concluding comments. 
 
2. Diaspora Groups and Non-Economic Remittances: Some Theories, Anecdotes, 
Observations and Best Practices 
 
In 2012, global diaspora networks were estimated to send over US$534 billion to their friends 
and families in developing countries (Diasporralliance.org, 2012). From our perspective, the 
non-economic remittances are even more important. We thus provide some theoretical and 
historic perspectives on the roles of non-economic remittances in entrepreneurship and economic 
development. 
 
2.1. Diaspora groups as institutional change agents in their homelands 
 
There are a number of reasons why diaspora networks are in a position to bring institutional 
changes in their ancestral homelands (Kshetri, 2013). First, diaspora networks are transnational 
in nature but tend to have a high degree of proximity —relational, positional and spatial —to 
their homeland. Prior research indicates that while transnational networks facilitate international 
trade by overcoming informal barriers, domestic networks facilitate barriers by collusion (Rauch, 
2001). Theoretically, this logic can be extended to argue that diaspora networks tend to be in a 
better position than most domestic networks in breaking institutional barriers to entrepreneurship 
in the developing world. No less important is the fact that because of a high degree of proximity, 
they can have a strong influence on the information and behavior of various institutional actors 
in their homeland (Rice and Aydin, 1991). 
 
Second, an enormous body of literature has documented the globalization-led institutional 
changes (Campbell, 2004). In this regard, the issue of institutional changes associated with 
diaspora networks is rather important because of the fact that personal globalization (e.g., 
consisting of telephone calls, travel and remittances) is one of the important dimensions of 
globalization (e.g., Globalization Index (GI) developed by Foreign Policy and A. T. Kearney), 
(Foreign Policy, 2007). It is thus reasonable to expect that social remittances associated with 
diaspora networks could be a trigger in bringing entrepreneurship-related institutional changes in 
the developing world.  
 
Third, because of political and economic globalization, national economies are weakening 
whereas diaspora networks have been empowered (Holm and Sorensen, 1995). Some economies, 
for instance, have established government agencies to encourage diasporas to help local 
communities, and provide policy advice (Ratha et al., 2011). At the 2003 Extra-Ordinary Summit 
of the Assembly of Heads of State and Governments, the African Union (AU) amended Article 
Three of its Constitutive Act to “invite and encourage the full participation of the African 
diaspora as an important part of the continent” (cf. Davies, 2010). 
 
2.2. Diaspora Greeks in their ancestral homeland in the nineteenth century 
 
Diaspora groups can challenge the traditional conception, assumptions and views about 
businesses in their homeland. The investment of diaspora Greeks in their ancestral homeland in 
the nineteenth century could be a nice and striking example to illustrate this idea. The Greek 
diaspora groups from the Ottoman territory, mainly the Eastern Mediterranean and Black Sea 
region, brought with them codes of business, which were new by the then Greek standard 
(Exertzoglou, 1988). In the beginning, most local businessmen considered the diaspora as a 
group of speculators and viewed their business activities as based on nonproductive practices 
(Xenos, 1869, cited in Chatziioannou, 2008). However, the diaspora group introduced new 
entrepreneurial practices such as stock exchanges and large-scale public works and redirected 
economic resources in entrepreneurial ventures that yielded higher economic returns (Sombart, 
1913 [1998]). Consequently, the new capitalist ethics and the diaspora’s risk taking propensities 
became an important societal force that brought new entrepreneurial ideas to individuals and the 
government and shaped and reshaped the Greek entrepreneurial landscape (Chatziioannou, 2000; 
Chatziioannou, 2008). Overall, economic and social patterns formed in the Greek diaspora 
community had favorable and long lasting impacts on entrepreneurial development in Greece 
(Minoglou, 2007). 
 
2.3. The twentieth century and the current century 
 
Fast forward to the last decades of the 20th Century and the current Century, when we can see 
successful and interesting examples of diaspora-led institutional changes in the developing 
world. For instance, diaspora’s contribution in rebuilding the Taiwanese economy has been 
mainly in the form of social remittances rather than economic remittances. In the 1980s, the 
Taiwanese government approached the diaspora in the West. It consulted and solicited views 
from executives with Taiwanese roots working in the United States and established formal 
forums to collect their inputs, which were used to formulate and implement various programs 
(Isenberg, 2010). 
 
In the same vein, the overseas Chinese have been at the forefront of important initiatives needed 
in the formation of social organizations promoting entrepreneurship (Kshetri, 2007). Following 
the 1978 political and economic reforms, China invested substantially in national development 
projects, which included the creation of special economic zones to attract the Chinese diaspora 
(Phillips, 2009). Likewise, entrepreneurial firms created by diaspora Indians have helped 
improve the quality and complexity of services provided by Indian firms to their Western clients, 
which moved away the Indian IT and business process management (IT&BPM) sector from the 
focus on low cost to high quality (Saxenian, 2006b). For instance, Silicon Valley-based Indian 
managers played instrumental roles in the development of MNC development centers in India’s 
main outsourcing hubs such as Bangalore and contributed to entrepreneurial resources (Saxenian, 
2003). Likewise, former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan noted that the African diaspora 
networks have helped transfer entrepreneurial skills and brought innovations in Africa (Annan, 
2011). Some sub-Saharan African (SSA) economies such as Rwanda, Ethiopia and Kenya have 
created “diaspora bonds” to encourage the involvement of their diasporas in development 
projects (Provost, 2012). 
 
Even in Arab economies, the diaspora has been a central force in bringing institutional changes. 
Many members of Arab diasporas have returned from Western countries, who are in political and 
business leadership positions in their home countries and have brought important political 
changes (Kshetri and Ajami, 2008). 
 
3. Some Key Determinants of Non-economic Remittances Associated with Diaspora 
Groups: The Case of LAC 
 
Diaspora networks have a potential to play an important role in stimulating entrepreneurship in 
LAC economies. Prior research indicates that remittances have played a key role in increasing 
economic growth and reducing inequality and poverty in these economies (Acosta et al., 2008). 
An estimate of the Multilateral Investment Fund (MIF) suggested that the Latin American 
migrants from the United States and Western Europe sent US$61 billion in remittances to their 
homelands annually (Inter-American Development Bank, 2012). Likewise, a study by the Inter-
American Development Bank found that, in 2005, 435,000 Latin American immigrants were 
living in Japan, who sent about US$2.65 annually to their home countries (Inter-American 
Development Bank/Multilateral Investment Fund, 2005). 
 
The education and skill levels of diaspora networks associated with the LAC region may warrant 
elaboration. One estimate suggested there were more that 50 million people of the Hispanic 
origin in the United States, who owned 1.6 million businesses (Diasporralliance.org, 2012). This 
Hispanic diaspora population includes highly skilled and educated entrepreneurs. Likewise, in 
2002, there were about 270,000 Brazilian immigrants living in Japan, more than half of whom 
were young and well educated. Most of them stayed in Japan for less than five years, saved 
money and returned to Brazil to open their own businesses (iadb.org, 2005). 
 
Prior researchers have suggested that the contribution of a given level of economic remittances to 
economic growth varies across regions. A ten percent increase in remittances lead to a 0.3 
percent long-run economic growth in the LAC region compared to 0.13 percent and 1.56 percent 
in Africa and Asia respectively (Nsiah and Fayissa, 2013). Thus, the contribution of a given level 
of remittance to economic growth in LAC economies is over twice as high as that in Africa but 
only 19 percent that of Asia. Regarding the inter-regional heterogeneity in the effect of economic 
remittances on economic growth, one likely possibility is that a given level of economic 
remittance is associated with different levels of non-economic remittances in these regions. This 
section focuses on some key factors that are likely to affect diaspora networks’ non-economic 
remittances. 
 
3.1. Nature of the host country 
 
Considering the roles of diaspora networks in creating entrepreneurship-related institutions (e.g., 
friendly regulations, culture and value systems to support entrepreneurship and higher levels of 
entrepreneurial skills) in the home country, they can be viewed as intermediation agencies 
between the host country and the homeland. In this regard, diaspora networks’ potential to 
transmit entrepreneurship friendly institutions in the home country is a function of these 
networks’ exposure to entrepreneurship related institutions in the host country as well as an 
opportunity to assimilate with the population and observe entrepreneurial and business practices, 
behaviors, activities and culture in organizations. Countries hosting diaspora networks (or 
immigrants) differ widely in terms of entrepreneur-friendliness of institutions and orientation 
toward immigrants. For instance, formal and informal institutions facilitating the birth and 
growth of entrepreneurial firms are weak or missing in developing countries (Nanda and Khanna, 
2008). Developed countries such as the United States, on the other hand, have environments to 
facilitate high impact entrepreneurship (Schramm, 2004). 
 
Host countries also differ in their orientation toward immigrants (Lobo and Salvo, 1998; 
Rumbaut, 1999), which affect diaspora networks’ skill levels, experiences and ideas that can be 
potentially transmitted to their homeland. In terms of orientation toward immigration, consider 
Simon’s (1998) categories. Simon’s first group views immigrants as an extra source of labor. 
Economies in this group include South Africa, the Gulf States, Gabon and Asian emerging 
economies. In the Middle East, for instance, recruiters organize most of the movements of 
workers on fixed term contracts. In most cases, contract workers are required to depart the 
receiving country upon completion of the contract. Moreover, they are not permitted to bring 
family members with them (Lucas, 2001). A low level of legal protection for immigrants and 
their limited assimilation into the host culture inhibits their internalization of entrepreneurial 
values and ideas. The sense of temporariness or a lack of permanence may act as a barrier to 
access to high quality entrepreneurial ideas. Benefits to immigrants through processes such as 
organizational socialization in the transmission of institutions from the organization to the 
employees are likely to be limited (Chao et al., 1994). 
 
The “old” immigration countries of Western Europe and North America, as well as Australia, 
New Zealand and Israel form Simon’s second group. These are arguably the most open countries 
for immigrants with well-institutionalized programs. Immigration policies are “routinized, 
expansionary and inclusive” (Freeman, 1997). They explicitly or implicitly allow immigrants to 
stay permanently. Immigrants receive social and legal protection and the acquisition of 
nationality is an important issue (Simon, 1998). In light of the above discussion, a key positive 
factor from LAC economies is that the proportion of LAC migrants in high-income OECD and 
non-OECD countries is highest among all the geographic regions. According to the World 
Bank’s Migration and Remittances Factbook 2011, the proportion of LAC migrants hosted by 
high-income OECD and non-OECD countries was 85.5 percent (The World Bank, 2011). The 
corresponding proportions for other regions were: 80.9 percent for East Asia and Pacific (EAP), 
38 percent for Europe and Central Asia (ECA), 63.4 percent for Middle East and North Africa 
(MENA), 57.8 percent for South Asia (SA) and 27.3 percent for SSA. 
 
3.2. General education, experience, skills and knowledge 
 
It would be reasonable to expect that diaspora networks’ levels of education, experience, skills 
and knowledge are positively associated with the flows of non-economic remittances to their 
ancestor homelands. In this regard, available evidence suggests that migrants associated with 
LAC economies tend to perform poorer in terms of these factors compared to those from some 
other economies. In the United States, for instance, immigrants from Latin America tend to be 
less educated compared to those from Asia. For instance, in California, only seven percent of 
immigrants from Latin America have college degrees. The corresponding proportions are 64 
percent for Southwest Asia and India and 56 percent for East Asia (Johnson, 2014). Likewise, 
only 4 percent of Mexican migrants in the United States are estimated to have tertiary level 
education. The proportions of migrants in the United States with tertiary level education are 
seven percent for Central America, twelve percent for the Caribbean, 24 percent for the Andean 
region and 30 percent for South American countries (Fajnzylber and López, 2007). Regardless of 
the level of education, compared with the native born population, Latin American migrant 
workers in the United States tend to be employed in low-skill jobs (Phillips, 2009). For instance, 
it is estimated that less than six percent of Mexican immigrants occupied professional or 
executive positions in the United States in the early 2000s (US-Mexico Binational Council, 
2004). 
 
4. The Concept of Non-Economic Remittances: Illustration in the LAC Context 
 
Because of the complex and multi-faceted nature of migration process, prior researchers have 
emphasized the importance of identifying various forms of non-economic remittances (Goldring, 
2004; Massey et al., 1993). At least three types of non-economic remittances can be 
distinguished: social, technical and political (Table 1). 
 
Table 1. The impacts of non-economic remittances on entrepreneurship: An illustration in the 




Explanations and Some 
Mechanisms 
Examples 
Social • Positive effect on wages in the host 
country, which may lead to an 
increase in economic remittances, 
which in turn promotes 
entrepreneurship. 
• Increasing awareness of and 
promoting a positive image of home 
country abroad. 
• Challenging the values that 
underpin the existing 
entrepreneurial system and helping 
diffuse new ideas, such as social 
responsibility. 
• Mexican migrants gathered by the Mexican 
Migration Project indicated the positive effect of 
social capital on wage. 
 
 
• Yo Creo en Colombia aims to enhance Colombia’s 
image with promotional activities directed at 
Colombian and international audiences. 
• BrazilFoundation engages in activities to raise 
awareness among the Brazilian diaspora about 
social projects in Brazil. Its goal is to promote 
corporate social responsibility among companies 
that invest in Brazil. 
Technical • Flows of knowledge, skills and 
technology. 
• Brazilian scientists working in the U.S. inform 
their old classmates working in Brazil about 
interesting and intriguing research being conducted 
in the U.S. labs. 
• ChileGlobal designs and finances business 
projects. Colombia’s Red Caldas was established 
to mobilize its members to contribute to economic 
and social advancement of Colombia. 
Political • Migration-led transformation in 
political identities, discourses and 
practices which are likely to 
promote entrepreneurship. 
• Medellín’s U.S.-educated mayor Sergio Fajardo 
transformed city by increasing spending on 
education, public transportation and microlending 
projects for SMEs. 
 
4.1. Social remittances 
 
Levitt (1996) has introduced the concept of social remittances, which is defined as “the ideas, 
behaviors, identities and social capital that flow from receiving to sending-country 
communities.” For instance, Aguilera and Massey’s (2003) analysis of data on male Mexican 
migrants gathered by the Mexican Migration Project indicated the positive effect of social capital 
on wages. For documented migrants, the authors found that close family members with 
migration experience played a positive role in determining wages. For undocumented migrants, 
the existence of distant relatives or friends in the United States positively affected wages. In this 
way, social capital is likely to translate to higher economic remittances, which may stimulate 
entrepreneurship. Likewise, a study of Colombian scientific diaspora living in Switzerland 
indicated that they benefit from the social capital. They make use of their professional and 
institutional contacts and social relations, which helps them to integrate in the country of 
residence (Tejada, 2010). Skilled Colombians have helped to enhance the country’s reputation. 
These attempts are likely to improve foreigners’ general perception of the country (Tejada, 
2010). One example is the private organization Yo Creo en Colombia, which was established by 
diasporas. It aims to enhance Colombia’s image with promotional activities directed at 
Colombian and international audiences (http://www.yocreoencolombia.com/). 
 
Diasporas can also challenge the values that underpin the existing entrepreneurial system and 
may help diffuse new ideas, such as social responsibility of businesses, which may become 
accepted criteria for evaluating business conduct. In this way, diasporas may help develop high 
quality entrepreneurial businesses. For instance, the nonprofit organization, BrazilFoundation has 
offices in New York, which engages in activities to raise awareness among the Brazilian 
diaspora about social projects in Brazil. Its goal is to promote corporate social responsibility 
among companies that invest in Brazil (Forman et al., 2007). 
 
4.2. Technical remittances 
 
Technical remittances are a second form of non-economic remittances, which refer to the flows 
of knowledge, skills and technology related to migration (Nichols, 2002). For instance, it is 
reported that Brazilian scientists working in the United States inform their old classmates 
working in Brazil about interesting and intriguing research being conducted in the U.S. labs 
(economist.com, 2011). To take another example, through a network of about 400 registered 
influential Chileans diaspora living in the Americas and Europe, ChileGlobal designs and 
finances business projects. The projects introduce innovations, strengthen human capital and 
promote technology and knowledge transfers (Agunias and Newland, 2012). 
 
Another example: as of 1999, the members of the Colombian Network of Researchers and 
Engineers Abroad (Red Caldas) were in 30 countries (Meyer and Brown, 1999). Red Caldas 
established to mobilize its members to contribute to economic and social advancement of 
Colombia. Caldas members have initiated a number of collaborative research projects. One such 
project the Bio 2000 aimed to apply instrumentation developed for physics and engineering in 
the areas of biology and medicine (Granes et al., 1998). Another project involved transfers of 
technology in the area of robotics, automation and industrial networks. Tejada’s (2010) study of 
skilled Colombians indicated that one-third of the respondents maintained regular scientific 
and/or professional exchanges with Colombia. 
 
4.3. Political remittances 
 
Political remittances represent still another form of non-economic remittances. Such remittances 
are related to the migration-led transformation in political identities, discourses and practices 
(Goldring, 1992; Moctezuma, 2000), which are likely to play a critical role in promoting 
entrepreneurship. Østergaard-Nielsen (2003) has identified five categories of politics from the 
perspective of “migrants’ organizations and their transnational networks”: immigrant politics, 
homeland politics, emigrant politics, diaspora politics and trans-local politics. She has suggested 
a three-step process to analyze migrants’ and diaspora networks’ political practices: mobilization 
(why), strategy (how) and impact (what). 
 
To take an example, the so called “nonconformist” U.S.-educated mayor Sergio Fajardo 
transformed the Colombia city of Medellín. After he became the city’s mayor in 2003, he 
brought about dramatic changes by nurturing an entrepreneurial environment (Kshetri et al., 
2014). Fajardo established innovation centers, allocated 40 percent of the city’s budget to 
education and spent US$17 million a year to stimulate entrepreneurship (Isenberg, 2010). He 
also increased spending on public transportation and microlending projects for SMEs. These 
measures have generated significant payoffs. Medellín’s homicide rate per 100,000 inhabitants 
decreased to 29 in 2006 from 381 in 1991 (Romero, 2007). Recent studies have suggested that 
Medellin is safer than Washington, D.C. and many other leading U.S. cities (Isenberg, 2010). 
During his appointment, Fajardo also took initiatives to form entrepreneurial networks linking 
local universities, entrepreneurs, private equity funds, large companies (e.g., the local power 
utility (EPM)), non-profit organizations (e.g., Proantioquia Foundation and Comfama) and 
diaspora networks with roots in Medellin. He also focused on building beautifully designed, 
technologically advanced, public libraries and community centers (Isenberg, 2010). His “Let’s 
Work Together,” motto led to the establishment of partnerships with key institutional actors, 
such as the national government, Medellin city councillors and other relevant groups such as the 
teachers’ union and affected neighbourhoods (comunas). 
 
The Ruta N project launched in July 2010 by the City Hall of Medellín is among the most 
successful projects undertaken by the local government to facilitate the growth of the 
outsourcing and offshoring industry. A three-building complex established in an area of the city 
plagued by crime, Ruta N forms part of the Medellin Cluster City initiative established in order 
to enhance the city’s competitiveness based on innovation and technological development 
(Medellin Digital, 2011). This project also emphasizes and promotes state-university-business-
society relationships. Public and private actors such as the city government, SENA, the Chamber 
of Commerce of Medellin, Proantioquia, universities, as well as national and multinational firms, 
have all participated in the project. The idea is to develop regional production systems from 
suppliers to customers, covering value chains in different economic sectors. Overall, these 
measures helped to create a more entrepreneurial friendly climate. In 2012, the Wall Street 
Journal named Medellín as the most innovative city in the world 
(http://online.wsj.com/ad/cityoftheyear). The city also has set the goal to become Latin 
America’s science, technology and innovation capital by 2021 (latino.foxnews.com, 2014). 
 
5. Some Measures Taken by LAC Economies that Might Stimulate Non-Economic 
Remittances 
 
Prior research has emphasized the importance of promoting linkages with diaspora networks 
abroad in cooperation with host countries or with international organizations (Connell et al., 
2007; Wickramasekara, 2003). Such linkages can help stimulate economic as well as non-
economic remittances. For instance, the International Organization for Migration manages the 
Ghana–Netherlands Healthcare Project, which is facilitated in the development of a center for the 
maintenance of medical equipment in Ghana. The project organizes short-term assignments and 
projects (e.g., internships for Ghanaian medical residents and the Netherlands-based specialists) 
to stimulate the transfer of knowledge, skills and experiences (Wiskow, 2005). 
 
Financial as well as nonfinancial measures can be taken to maximize the contribution of non-
economic remittances to stimulate entrepreneurial activities in the home countries. Table 2 
presents some of these measures in the context of LAC economies. Such measures have been 
taken at the home as well as the host countries. 
 
Table 2. Some examples of measures taken at the home and the host countries that are likely to 
stimulate noneconomic remittances and their impacts. 




• Brazil: Partnership of CAIXA with 
a U.S. bank to develop six financial 
products linked to remittances.  
• Colombia: Nos Une has teamed up 
with the BANCOLDEX to offer 
lines of credit to diaspora 
entrepreneurs, who want to start 
their businesses in Colombia.  
• Chile: ChileGlobal designs and 
finances business projects. 
• Colombia: Nos Une provides 
microcredit for Colombian 





• Brazil: Entrepreneurial and business 
training via SEBRAE’s online 
training program.  
• La Idea: helps to increase awareness 
of entrepreneurs regarding the 
resources available and organizes 
various events. It has established a 
virtual marketplace platform to 
strengthen entrepreneurship among 
the Latin American diaspora. 
• Colombia: ProMicro established by 
Nos Une and the Colombian 
consulate in NewYork offer support 
to small businesses in New York 
and New Jersey that are run by 
Colombians. The program provides 
technical assistance and free legal 
consultations for starting and 
growing businesses in the U.S. and 
offers work-related education via 
the SENA. 
 
As mentioned earlier, immigrants who acquire higher levels of entrepreneurship-related skills, 
competencies, experiences and abilities at the host countries are likely to contribute more to the 
development of entrepreneurship in their home countries. Measures taken to increase diaspora 
networks’ engagement in entrepreneurial activities in the host countries are thus likely to have a 
positive impact on the home country. Policy makers also have realized the importance of 
initiatives to increase entrepreneurial opportunities for diaspora communities in the homeland 
and motivate them to engage in entrepreneurial activities. 
 
Colombia’s Nos Une, which is a development program of the Colombian Ministry of External 
Relations, has teamed up with the Colombian Foreign Trade Bank (BANCOLDEX) to offer lines 
of credit to diaspora entrepreneurs who want to start their businesses in Colombia. Nos Une also 
offers nonfinancial support to such entrepreneurs. For instance, it works with local universities to 
train potential entrepreneurs on business, management and other areas (Agunias and Newland, 
2012). Nos Une, in partnership with the Colombian consulate in New York, started ProMicro, 
which was a pilot project to offer support to small businesses in New York and New Jersey that 
are run by Colombians. The program provides technical assistance and free legal consultations 
for starting and growing businesses in the United States and offers work-related education 
through the National Service for Training or (Servicio Nacional de Aprendizaje) (SENA). It also 
provides microcredit for Colombian entrepreneurs. To help Colombian diasporas create 
successful business plans, ProMicro has collaborated with a network of over 25 private and 
public partner organizations. As of 2012, ProMicro had provided services to 650 members and 
offered a number of workshops. It also announced a plan to expand to other regions of the United 
States (Agunias and Newland, 2012). 
 
Similar efforts have been made by governments at various levels in Brazil. For instance, the city 
government of Governador Valadares (Minas Gerais) has teamed up with the Bank of Brazil to 
support entrepreneurial activities involving Brazilian diasporas (Levitt and de la Dehesa, 2003). 
Likewise, to promote investment by the diasporas and provide advice, in 2001, the Inter-
American Development Bank (IDB) and the Brazilian government created a fund, which was 
especially targeted to the Brazilian diasporas living in Japan (Levitt and de la Dehesa, 2003). 
 
CAIXA and the Brazilian Support Service for Micro and Small Businesses (Serviço Brasileiro de 
Apoio à Micro e Pequena Empresa, SEBRAE) have launched an initiative to facilitate Brazilian 
diasporas’ engagement in entrepreneurial activities when they return to Brazil. Brazilian 
diasporas in the United States with entrepreneurial capacity are provided entrepreneurial and 
business training via SEBRAE’s online training program. The key idea here is that when they 
return to the homeland, Brazilian diasporas are likely to be in a position to start their own 
businesses using their savings. In addition, SEBRAE is making efforts to ensure that remittance 
recipients in Brazil get appropriate training to start and grow their businesses (Agunias and 
Newland, 2012). CAIXA provides tailored financial services to migrants and their relatives. As 
of 2012, CAIXA had established a partnership with a U.S. bank, conducted needs assessments of 
Brazilian diasporas living in Massachusetts and developed six financial products linked to 
remittances (Agunias and Newland, 2012). 
 
Several international agencies have also collaborated with other such agencies and national 
governments. In 2011, the Secretary’s Office of Global Partnerships (S/GP) and the United 
States Agency for International Development (USAID) teamed up to launch the International 
diaspora Engagement Alliance (IdEA) at the Global Diaspora Forum. 
 
The Latin American IdEA Partnership (La IdEA) is a business competition platform, which was 
established to stimulate collaboration between entrepreneurs in the United States and Latin 
America. It helps to increase awareness of these entrepreneurs regarding the resources available. 
It also organizes various events and has established a virtual marketplace platform to strengthen 
entrepreneurship among the Latin American diaspora (Diasporralliance.org, 2012). 
 
A key idea behind the establishment of IdEA is to utilize the global connections of diaspora 
communities to promote sustainable development in their homelands. A number of partnerships 
have been formed around entrepreneurship (e.g., providing supports to diaspora entrepreneurs in 
investing and building sustainable enterprises), volunteerism/philanthropy (stimulating diaspora 
giving in education, health, nutrition, disaster relief and other areas), and innovation (research 
and other firms of collaboration between diaspora communities and their counterparts in the 
homelands in science and technology), the Alliance provides a platform for capacity-building 
and a forum for collaboration across (state.gov, 2014). 
 
6. Discussion and Implications 
 
It is important to note that diaspora networks’ non-economic remittances influence 
entrepreneurial activities in their homelands directly as well as through indirect causal chains. 
First, these networks often possess high levels of entrepreneurial skills, experience, ideas, 
technology and knowledge, which are likely to facilitate entrepreneurial development in their 
homelands. Second, in addition to such networks’ direct roles in influencing entrepreneurial 
activities, they are also likely to play indirect roles such as strengthening formal and informal 
institutions related to entrepreneurship (e.g., entrepreneurship-friendly regulations) and helping 
other migrant workers to gain skills and entrepreneurial experiences and find employment 
opportunities. 
 
From the above discussion, it is clear that, if properly utilized, diaspora networks from the LAC 
can further stimulate entrepreneurship and serve as an important engine of growth and 
development of their homelands. The studies reviewed above regarding key factors that are 
likely to affect diaspora networks’ non-economic remittances suggest that although some factors 
favor LAC economies vis-à-vis other regions, the region is at a disadvantage in terms of other 
factors. An observation that is especially important from the standpoint of non-economic 
remittances is that the proportion of LAC migrants in high-income OECD and non-OECD 
countries is higher than any other geographic regions. At the same time, immigrants from these 
economies in the United States are often less educated and tend to be employed in low-skill jobs 
compared to those from Asia. 
 
One can conclude from the above discussion that diaspora networks’ social capital and the 
strengths of linkages with the homeland are tightly linked to their homelands’ entrepreneurship 
and economic development. In the LAC context, despite some encouraging signs of the positive 
roles of social capital on entrepreneurship development, diaspora networks from some LAC 
economies are characterized by relatively low degrees of social capital and linkages with their 
homelands. For instance, significant trade ties have been reported between Colombia and Florida 
thanks to a growing number of international businesses opened by Colombian migrants in 
Florida. These businesses mainly focus on trade with the Colombian migrants’ home state. In the 
early 2000s, about five percent of all Florida’s external trade was with Colombia (Collier and 
Gamarra, 2003). A study of Colombian diaspora networks in South Florida indicated that 
Colombian migrants have not established strong economic, political and social linkages with 
their homeland (Collier and Gamarra, 2003). Especially, political linkages are extremely low, or 
non-existent despite the Colombian government’s actions to encourage the diaspora’s political 
participation. Socially, the linkages are primarily with family and close friends. Some economic 
linkages with their homeland exist, but they are primarily driven by necessity. 
 
A key lesson and take-away that we can gain from some entrepreneurially successful efforts of 
some LAC economies is that the primary focus of diaspora policies need to be centered around 
utilizing various forms of non-economic remittances in stimulating the quantity and quality of 
entrepreneurial activities. Although some economies such as China and Taiwan have used 
diaspora networks as a means to achieve their policy objectives, many LAC economies have not 
been able to do so. The conception and delivery of a quality entrepreneurial environment is 
crucial to attract diaspora networks with the highest potential to bring institutional changes in the 
homeland. However, once such an environment is developed, it is likely to provide positive 
feedback showing a virtuous circle and self-reinforcing improvement in institutions. 
 
Experiences of some economies indicate that LAC economies are also likely to benefit from 
diaspora networks’ participation in political and other social affairs through sectoral institutions 
and formal networks such as trade associations. An example is India’s National Association of 
Software and Service Companies (NASSCOM), which had several returnees as prominent 
advisors of board members (Docquier and Rapoport, 2012). The NASSCOM has played a key 
role in raising the profile of the India’s rapidly growing IT&BPM sector. Most LAC economies 
currently lack such participation. 
 
7. Future Research Directions 
 
This study has laid the groundwork for a number of future research directions. First, we limited 
our analysis mainly to LAC economies. Future research based on the present framework can be 
extended to other geographic regions, mainly in the context of developing economies. 
 
Second, this study mainly focused on activities taken by governments at various levels. Case 
studies at the level of an industry or individual firms might be worthwhile target of study. For 
instance, researchers could examine how one or more forms of non-economic remittances 
discussed above affected entrepreneurial activities at an industry. A survey of India’s IT&BPM 
sector found that 30–40 percent of the higher-level employees had work experiences in 
industrialized countries (Commander et al., 2008). Such studies can also be undertaken at the 
firm levels. For instance, all top managers of India’s Tata Consulting Services had worked or 
studied abroad (economist.com, 2011). 
 
Finally, it is reasonable to assume that various forms of non-economic remittances are not 
equally important and that specific forms of remittances are likely to have a stronger relationship 
with entrepreneurial activities in economies characterized by certain social, economic and 
institutional factors. Future research might examine the contexts and processes associated with 
the various forms of non-economic remittances discussed above in terms of their relative 
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